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Summary
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
are part of the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  These operations
cover a wide variety of combat and non-combat missions ranging from fighting
insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstruction operations, to training military forces
of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics.
Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 18,000 to just a few
hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries are
achieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that
might be applied in Iraq as well as for future GWOT operations.  Potential issues for
Congress include the long-term U.S. military strategy in Southeast Asia and Africa,
proposals for NATO to assume command of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan, and how counternarcotics operations in that country should be
conducted.  This report will not discuss the provision of equipment and weapons to
countries where the U.S. military is conducting counterterrorism operations nor will
it address Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which are also aspects of the
Administration’s GWOT military strategy. This report will be updated on a periodic
basis.
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1  CRS has a wide variety of reports on Iraq. The following reports discuss the military
aspects of Iraq in great detail: CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces and
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations and Costs.
2  For additional information on U.S. Special Operations Forces see CRS Report RS21048,
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress and CRS
Report RS22017, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations:
Issues for Congress.
U.S. Military Operations and the
Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan,
Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
Overview
U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began
on October 7, 2001 and continue today.  The military component is just one aspect
in this endeavor  which also involves diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and
financial efforts intended to defeat  terrorists around the world.  This report focuses
on U.S. military operations in four areas —  Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and
Colombia — although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activities in
other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the
Administration.  While some consider military operations in Iraq as part of this war,
many do not, and because of the complexity of this issue Iraq is treated separately and
in greater detail in other CRS reports.1 
Congress has a wide ranging interest in U.S. military operations in these regions.
Some suggest that these operations have lessons learned that could be useful in Iraq
and also in future operations. Others also question what the Administration’s long-
term goals are for ongoing military operations in Southeast Asia and Africa. U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) have played a central role in all four of these U.S.
military operations — not just in direct combat but also other roles such as training
and civil affairs — and their use raises a variety of issues for potential congressional
consideration.2
CRS-2
3 For a more detailed treatment of  Afghanistan see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan:
Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Updated regularly).
4 Lisa Burgess, “U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan at 17,900 and Expected to Hold
Steady,” Stars and Stripes, July 9, 2004.
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8 U.S. Department of Defense News Release No. 1289-04, December 14, 2004, “DOD
Announces OEF/OIF Rotational Coverage.”




There are approximately 18,000 U.S. military personnel in and around
Afghanistan.  Troops currently in Afghanistan represent the fifth major troop rotation
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since the United States became involved in
the fall of 2001. At present, the majority of U.S. ground forces come from the
Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division.4  U.S. Special Forces are also operating in
Afghanistan and are primarily concerned with capturing or killing Taliban and Al
Qaeda leaders.  In addition, Army units from the Oklahoma National Guard are
working with forces from other coalition countries on training the new Afghan
National Army (ANA).5 The Marines have elements from the Camp Pendelton,
California-based First (I) Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) deployed to
Afghanistan as part of OEF 5.6
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander, Army General John
Abizaid, has reportedly requested about 20,000 troops for the sixth rotation (OEF 6)
and these units will take over in March 2005.7  Major forces for  OEF 6 include
headquarters elements from the Southern European Task Force (Airborne) from
Vicenza, Italy, the 173rd Airborne Brigade also from Vicenza, a brigade from the 82nd
Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Florida National Guard’s
53rd Infantry Brigade which will be involved with ANA training.8  The Second (II)
MEF from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina will supply the Marine component to OEF
6.9
Security for Presidential Elections.  In September 2004, the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO) deployed additional troops to
Afghanistan on a temporary basis to assist in providing security for the October 9
presidential elections.  The U.S. provided about 1,100 additional troops from the 82nd
Airborne Division and NATO allies Italy, Spain, and Great Britain sent about 1,500
soldiers.  These soldiers, along with about 15,000 ANA soldiers and 48,000 Afghan
police provided security for some 21,521 voting stations in Afghanistan. The
CRS-3
10  Joshua Kuccera, “Paving the Way to Peace,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 15, 2004,
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15 “New Push Targets Taliban Rebels,” Baltimore Sun, December 12, 2004.
16 Charlie Coon, “Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Says Troop Levels Should Remain
Steady at 18,000.” European Stars and Strips, January 15, 2005.
17 For a breakdown of ISAF contributing nations and their troop contributions as of
November 23, 2004 see [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm].
election, held on October 9, was characterized as uneventful aside from a few
isolated attacks on remote voting stations and Afghans reportedly turned out “en
masse” in what some international observers reported as “free and fair” elections.10
U.S. Army Lieutenant General David Barno, commander of Combined Joint Task
Force-180 (CJTF-180) reportedly called the election “a big defeat for the Taliban”
given their numerous public threats to disrupt the elections.11 
The Winter Offensive. On December 11, 2004 — four days after Afghan
president Hamid Karzai’s inauguration — U.S. forces began “Operation Lightning
Freedom” in an attempt to further eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda forces prior to the
April 2005 Afghan National Assembly elections. According to a U.S. military
spokesman, the operation — going on throughout Afghanistan — is intended to
“search out and destroy the remaining remnants of Taliban forces who traditionally
we believe go to ground in the winter.”12  The 25th Infantry Division Commander,
Major General Eric Olson, also reportedly stated that U.S. forces would also be
redeployed to tighten border security with Pakistan and that U.S. Special Forces
would conduct raids to capture insurgent leaders.13 Another commonly perceived
objective of Operation Lighting Freedom is to convince militants to accept President
Karzai’s and the U.S. military’s offer of amnesty shortly after the inauguration.14
Major General Olson reportedly suggested that if a large number of Taliban give up
and return to their villages, that U.S. troop strength might be reduced this summer
after planned parliamentary elections.15  The commander of CJTF-180, LTG Barno,
however stated that the current U.S. troop strength — around 18,000 — would
remain steady throughout the year.16  To date, little has been publically reported
regarding how Operation Lightning Freedom is progressing, although Taliban attacks
appear to have become more sporadic and less lethal in recent months.
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
ISAF is a NATO-led organization, consisting of approximately 8,000 troops
from 36 NATO nations, as well as troops from nine partner and two non-aligned
countries.17  The United States has approximately 200 troops assigned to ISAF but
these troops serve primarily in staff and support roles.  ISAF operates under a series
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listing of these countries as of June 2004.
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22  Joshua Kuccera, p. 25.
23 Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability - Petersberg - December 2, 2002
[http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/friedenspolitik/afgh
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of U.N. mandates and conducts security patrols in Kabul and surrounding districts
and runs several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) located throughout
Afghanistan.18  In addition ISAF coordinates Civil Military Cooperation projects
throughout the area of operations.19  ISAF does not participate in offensive operations
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda — these operations are carried out by the U.S.-led
CJTF-180 and forces from 19 other countries20 (including some countries that have
other forces assigned to ISAF) and the ANA.  ISAF is considered by some as
important not only from a security perspective but also from an economy of force
perspective in that its existence permits the United States to focus the majority of its
troops on combating Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents.   
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 21
PRTs are small, civil-military teams originally designed to extend the authority
of the Afghan central government beyond Kabul and to facilitate aid and
reconstruction projects.  The U.S., British, and German militaries provide the security
component for these 19 teams spread throughout Afghanistan.  PRTs have enabled
coalition forces to extend a degree of security to outlying regions and have also
permitted U.S. forces to establish personal relationships with local Afghan leaders
which some believe has helped to diminish insurgent influence in a number of
regions.22 
U.S. Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
Training of the ANA commenced shortly after U.S. and coalition forces
defeated Taliban forces in early 2002.  The Bonn II Conference on rebuilding
Afghanistan in December 2002 mandated a 70,000 strong Afghan National Army
consisting of officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers in ground and air
forces, air defense forces, civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense, student
cadets of post-secondary institutions and other specialized units.23  Reportedly under
existing plans, these forces will not be fully operational until 2011 and could possibly
grow beyond 70,000 to include additional specialized units and a reserve
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25  “Afghan Army Has Made Great Progress, Says U.S. Officer,” American Forces Press
Service, January 10, 2005.
26 Ibid.
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23, 2004.
28 Ibid.
29 For a detailed treatment of both military and non-military aspects of this issue see CRS
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Terror,” CATO Institute - Foreign Policy Briefing No. 84, November 10, 2004 and “Fear
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31 Ibid., pp 2-3.
component.24  The ANA currently has almost 21,000 troops, with about 17,800
trained troops and about 3,400 still in training.25  Most agree that a significant U.S.
military presence will remain in Afghanistan until additional ANA forces are trained
and the ANA becomes self-sufficient.
According to some, the ANA soldiers are proving to be effective and willing
participants in U.S. counterinsurgency operations.26  ANA forces right out of training
were integrated into U.S.-led combat operations against insurgents and ANA forces
have been employed on numerous occasions by the Afghan government to “douse
flareups” between Afghanistan’s rival regional leaders who control about 30,000
armed fighters and who exert varying degrees of influence in many regions of the
country.27  Although some characterize the ANA as more effective than Iraq’s new
national army, the ANA experienced a number of issues early in its development and
Afghan officials credit the U.S. military with providing “the backbone” of the ANA,
agreeing that it will take some time before the ANA achieves the necessary degree
of self sufficiency.28
The War on Drugs 29
Afghanistan’s opium industry is estimated to employ directly or indirectly
anywhere between 20 to 30 percent of the Afghan population and provides for almost
60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).30  Both the
Administration and some members of Congress have reportedly called for the
eradication of Afghanistan’s illegal narcotics trade and U.S. military involvement in
supporting or participating interdiction and eradication operations with Afghan
forces.31  Many analysts as well as senior U.S. military officials suggest that such a
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policy is not only not achievable given U.S. force levels in Afghanistan but could
also significantly undermine its counterinsurgency campaign.32 
The cultivation of poppies — used in making opium for heroin — which was
reportedly regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished after the elimination of
the Taliban regime.33  In August 2004, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly
stated that U.S.-led coalition forces were “preparing a coordinated effort to attack the
narcotics trade in the country, recognizing that drug income could be used to fund
insurgents and terrorists.”34  While few doubt the validity of this assertion, others
believe that a policy of direct involvement by the U.S. military would not only
adversely affect the U.S. military campaign against insurgents but also pose a risk for
the Karzai government.35  The central premise is that many of the regional
commanders  who have helped the United States in the fight against the Taliban and
Al Qaeda derive significant revenues from the drug trade.36  Some experts suggest
that an aggressive eradication plan could drive these powerful figures into an alliance
with the insurgents.37 United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Deputy
Commander, Air Force Lieutenant General Lance Smith, reportedly stated that
“Central Command would rather not be in the drug eradication business ... we have
spent a lot of capital in trying to build relationships with people and now this has the
potential for us to do things that wouldn’t be popular.”38
It appears that the U.S. military has modified its position on involvement in
counternarcotics operations. Reportedly,  Air Force Lieutenant General Lance Smith
recently stated that “it is absolutely clear to us, that everything that we’ve done in
Afghanistan would be for [nothing] if we allowed the narcotraffickers to take over.
So it is clear that we have a role to play.”39  Although officials allegedly have not yet
finalized the details of this support, some suggest that it will likely involve providing
additional aerial surveillance, providing airlift into staging areas and security to
Afghan counternarcotics police, and additional training for Afghan National Police
who provide security for drug eradication operations.40  One report suggests that the
United States may provide the Afghan National Police with up to eight U.S. or
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Russian helicopters for their use in counternarcotics operations.41  Even if U.S.
military forces are not directly involved, some suggest these efforts might still push
militia commanders to oppose the Karzai.42
The Horn of Africa43
 
In October 2002, the United States established Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA) to combat terrorism in the region. For the purpose of
this operation, the Horn of Africa is defined as “the total airspace and land areas out
to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and
Yemen.”44  CJTF-HOA is headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and consists
of approximately 2,000 personnel including U.S. military and Special Operations
Forces (SOF), U.S. civilian, and coalition force members.45  In addition to CJTF-
HOA, Combined Task Force (CTF)150 is a naval task force consisting of ships from
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, New Zealand, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States, and has the task of monitoring, inspecting, boarding,
and stopping suspect shipping not only in the Horn of Africa region, but also in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.46
Mission and Operations
The stated missions of CJTF-HOA and CTF-150 are “to detect, disrupt and
defeat terrorists who pose an imminent threat to coalition partners in the region ...”
and to “work with host nations to deny the reemergence of terrorist cells and
activities by supporting international agencies working to enhance long-term stability
for the region.”47  CJTF-HOA has reportedly devoted the majority of its effort to date
to train with other coalition forces and to train selected armed forces units of the
countries of Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
CRS-8
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49 Ibid.
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tactics.48  In addition, CJTF-HOA has conducted a variety of civil affairs missions
including rebuilding schools and medical clinics as well as providing medical
services to the aforementioned three countries.49 CJTF-HOA has also provided
military training to Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. As part of the
Administration’s $125 million Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, troops
in Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco will also receive military training
and equipment.50  Some note that there has been little reported in terms of actual
terrorist interdiction operations, other than non-specific remarks by a departing
CJTF-HOA commander that they had captured “dozens of terrorists” and averted at
least five terrorist attacks.51  Others suggest, however, that publicizing these activities
might not only reduce the cooperation of countries in the region but could also
compromise sensitive ongoing efforts to capture terrorists and disrupt terror
networks. 
A Model for Future Operations?
Some suggest that U.S. military activities in the Horn of Africa region may
serve as a model for future war on terror operations.  Robert D. Kaplan of the
Atlantic Monthly writes:
The goal will be suppression of terrorist networks through the training of — and
combined operations with — indigenous troops. That is why the Pan-Sahel
[Trans Saharan] Initiative in Africa, in which Marines and Army Special Forces
have been training local militaries in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad, in order
to counter Al Qaeda infiltration of sub-Saharan Africa, is a surer paradigm for
the American imperial future than anything occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In months of travels with the American military, I have learned that the smaller
the American footprint and the less notice it draws from international media, the
more effective is the operation.52
David Ignatius of the Washington Post writes:
That suggests a dirty, drawn-out conflict in which each side tests the other’s will
and staying power. It’s not the sort of war that democracies are usually good at
fighting ... Yet because the battlefield is society itself, the United States cannot
think of the struggle in purely military terms. CENTCOM’s 1,000 troops who are
digging wells and performing other reconstruction tasks in the Horn of Africa
may be a better model for success than the 150,000 soldiers hunkered down in
Iraq.53
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Although these observers believe that U.S. military operations in the Horn of
Africa could serve as a template for future GWOT operations, others suggest an
ulterior motive for U.S. engagement in the region as well as some potential problems.
Some analysts believe that in addition to combating terrorism, that U.S. involvement
in the region responds to “a need to protect Africa’s rapidly expanding oil industry.”54
These analysts note that at present, the United States imports about 15 percent of its
oil from Africa — a figure which could reportedly rise to as much as 25 percent
within a decade.55  According to one source, a senior U.S. official predicted that
African oil would become potentially more important to the United States than oil
from Russia or the Caucasus and that the African oil industry ran the risk of
imploding as a result of “the region’s inherent instability” unless “the U.S. did
something more to prop it up.”56 
Some experts feel that the region’s instability could also pose some other
potential problems.  One concern is that countries receiving U.S. military training and
arms and equipment could easily use these resources against internal opposition
groups as well as other countries in the region.57  Another concern is that countries
such as Sudan and Somalia either have poor relations with the United States or are
in such a state of internal disarray that any sort of military operation with the United
States is difficult at best.58  Still others note that an excessive focus on a military
solution could detract from other efforts designed to address the root causes of
terrorism in the region.
The Philippines59
The government of the Philippines, a long time and major non-NATO ally of
the United States, faces an insurgency threat from four major  groups — three Islamic
groups who seek an independent state in Mindanao and one communist group which
seeks a Marxist state.60  One group in particular, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), has
reported financial and training links to Al Qaeda and has become the focus of the
Administration’s counterterror efforts in the region.61  Estimates vary on the size of
Abu Sayyaf — ranging from one thousand to a couple of hundred fighters — and
their activities were largely aimed at the Philippine government until 2001 when
allegations emerged that Abu Sayyaf had been involved in planning the assassination
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(continued...)
of the Pope during a planned visit to the Philippines and also plans to hijack and
destroy 12 U.S. airliners.62  Philippine authorities reportedly suspect that Abu Sayyaf
had a role in the October 2002 bombing near a Philippine military base which killed
three Filipinos and one U.S. Army Special Forces soldier.63
Operations
U.S. military operations in the Philippines are limited by the Philippine
constitution (foreign military forces are not permitted to participate in combat
operations on Filipino territory) to training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
tactics, advising Filipino units, and participating in civil-military operations.  The
focus of civil-military operations is to limit the influence of insurgents with the local
population, particularly in the southern region where most Abu Sayyaf and other
Islamic insurgent group activity is focused. 
The United States has been conducting large joint training exercises with the
Philippines since 1981 called the Balikatan exercises.64  In 2002, two  Balikatan
exercises were conducted — one from January through July and one from April
through May.65  The first exercise, Balikatan 2002-1, reportedly involved 1,650 U.S.
troops, including 150 U.S. Army and Navy special forces troops.66  This operation
was conducted on Basilan and Zamboagna  islands in the southern Philippines —
areas where Abu Sayyaf frequently operates — and was intended to destroy the Abu
Sayyaf group as well as free a U.S. missionary couple who were taken hostage in
May 2001.67  These operations were conducted by the Filipino military with the U.S.
serving in a training and advisory role.  Some sources suggest that these operations
by the Philippine armed forces “severely disrupted” and “significantly reduced” the
Abu Sayyaf Group.68  The second exercise, Balikatan 2002-2, involving 2,665 U.S.
troops, was held on the island of Luzon and focused on civil-military operations and
a humanitarian assistance exercise.69 
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The 2003 Balikatan exercise generated controversy in the United States and the
Philippines when it was reported that U.S. soldiers, Marines, and special forces with
their Filipino compatriots would “conduct or support combat patrols” against Abu
Sayyaf.70  This proposed U.S. participation in combat, allegedly sanctioned by both
Philippine President Arroyo and the Bush Administration, resulted in significant
political opposition in the Philippines.71  Balikatan 2003 was eventually modified to
insure that U.S. forces would not participate in combat operations.
Balikatan 2004 was conducted from February 23, 2004 to March 7, 2004 for two
weeks and involved about 2,500 U.S. troops participating in a variety of exercises
and training sessions with the Philippine Armed Forces.72  U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM) reports that Balikatan 2005 is scheduled for February 21 through
March 6 but specific details are not available.73
The United States has frequently conducted lower-level training exercises with
specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces.74  This training,
typically involving no more than 100 U.S. Special Forces troops at one time, focuses
on the training of individuals and small units on planning, tactics, and techniques and
also on specialized counterterrorism equipment provided to the Philippine Armed
Forces. Reportedly, the United States has also begun counter-drug training with the
Philippines which is considered a major drug transhipment center and a major
regional producer of marijuana.75  
A Second Front for the War on Terrorism?
Some suggest that U.S. involvement in the Philippines is part of a greater U.S.
strategy to combat Islamic terrorism throughout Southeast Asia.76  Some U.S.
officials reportedly believe that Abu Sayyaf has established connections with Jemaah
Islamiyah, an Al Qaeda affiliate operating across Indonesia and the Philippines, who
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are believed to be responsible for a string of bombings including Bali in 2002 and the
Davao bombings in 2003.77  While some note the relative success of joint U.S.-
Filipino training exercises in combating Abu Sayyaf, others warn that increasing U.S.
involvement could “complicate” the Philippine’s insurgency dilemma and also
possibly fuel anti-American sentiment in the region which could form the basis “of
a new pan-Islamic solidarity in the region.”78  Some experts contend that not all
militant Muslim groups operating in Southeast Asia are aligned with Al Qaeda and
it is important that U.S. counterterror efforts in the region “do not motivate these
potential affiliates to join the Al Qaeda cause.”79
Colombia
Colombia occupies a unique position in the Administration’s global war on
terror in that its targeted terrorist groups are Marxist as opposed to Islamic-based and
have no reported links to Al Qaeda or other Islamic groups. U.S. military
involvement began in 2000 under “Plan Colombia” and was limited to training
Colombian counternarcotics units.  Colombia has been involved for almost forty
years in what some describe as a civil war and others describe as a counterinsurgency
campaign against three major groups.  The first two groups, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia  (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) started in the
1950s as Marxist revolutionary groups but reportedly have lost most of their
ideological support and have transformed into violent criminal organizations.80   The
other group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is a conglomerate
of illegal self-defense groups formed in rural areas where the Colombian government
did not exert a strong presence.81  All three groups allegedly fund their activities
through drug revenues82 and are on the Administration’s official list of terrorist
organizations.83  These groups also currently hold a number of Colombian and
foreign hostages whom they use as negotiating leverage — these include three U.S.
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defense contractors who where taken by the FARC in February 2003 when their
observation plane was shot down.84
In 2002, the U.S. military’s role in Colombia changed from focusing on
counternarcotics training to counterinsurgency training. Under P.L. 107-206, 2002
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, the U.S. military was directed to support a
unified campaign against narcotics trafficking as well as directly against the FARC,
ELN, and AUC, although the U.S. military is not permitted to participate in combat
operations.85  In addition, $6 million was provided to train and equip a Colombian
military unit to protect the Canon-Limon Oil Pipeline86 from insurgent attacks.87  P.L.
107-206 also limited U.S. military participation in Colombia to 400 military
personnel and 400 defense contractors.88  The majority of the U.S. military forces are
from the Army’s 7th Special Forces Group in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Results and an Increase in U.S. Military Presence
With its new mandate, in October 2002 U.S. Special Forces reportedly began
training  a 600-man Colombian “commando” battalion designed to hunt down and
kill insurgents and an infrastructure protection force primarily intended to protect the
Canon-Limon pipeline.89  In 2003, the Colombian government issued a report entitled
“Three Years of Successful U.S. - Colombia Cooperation in the Fight Against Drug
Trafficking and Terrorism”90 which provides a variety of statistics related  to progress
in the wars on drugs and terrorism. Although the report gives a great deal of credit
to U.S. military assistance, experts note that much of the progress cited in the report
is directly attributed to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s commitment to destroy
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the country’s drug industry and end the insurgency either through force or
diplomacy.91  The report cites the following results as indicators of success:
! Colombia has 60 percent more combat-ready troops than four years
ago, including three U.S.- trained anti-narcotics brigades (2,300
troops);
! A total of 4,602 guerillas and 1,986 members of self-defense groups
were captured during the last year (from August 2002 to June 2003).
During the first half of 2003, 385 members of illegal groups have
turned themselves in, more than twice the total number of surrenders
recorded during 2002;
! During the first quarter of 2003, compared to the same period in
2002, Colombian Armed Forces were more effective in combat as
can be demonstrated by 80 and 30  percent  increases in AUC and
subversive group members killed in combat, respectively; and
! Forty percent fewer attacks on the Canon-Limon pipeline during the
first quarter of 2003 as compared to the previous year.92  
In testimony to the House Government Reform Committee on June 17, 2004,
U.S. defense officials called on Congress to support an Administration request to
raise the personnel cap to 800 military and 600 civilian contractors.93  The National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2005 approved this request.94  While some
criticized this increase, calling it a major step towards larger U.S. troop commitments
and involvement,95 U.S. Southern Command officials stated that the intent of the
increase was not so much  to deploy another 400 troops to Colombia on a permanent
basis but to allow them the flexibility to request and deploy additional forces,
including transitory military aircrews and military officials conducting assessment
visits, without having to withdraw troops already in Colombia in order to meet the
original 400 troop cap.96
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Issues for Congress
Lessons Learned and Possible Implications for Future
Operations
Some experts suggest that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the
Philippines, and Colombia provide many valuable lessons which could not only be
useful for U.S. forces in Iraq but also in the planning and conduct of future GWOT
operations.  In Afghanistan, some credit the implementation of a decentralized
counterinsurgency strategy in 2003, along with a “broad international backing” with
helping to stabilize the situation enough so that elections could be conducted and
reconstruction could proceed in a relatively secure environment.97  According to U.S.
Army Lieutenant General David Barno, commander of Combined Joint Task Force-
180 (CJTF-180):
The center of gravity became the Afghan people. If you can provide
reconstruction, provide security, bring benefits to the Afghan national
government to those provinces, then what you do is deny that area to the
insurgents.98 
Another potential lesson involves the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA
has been given credit by many for successful participation in combat operations with
coalition forces, providing security for the elections, and helping to quell
disagreements amongst rival Afghan regional leaders and their followers.99  The U.S.
officer overseeing the training of the ANA notes that the key to the ANA’s success
has been the successful integration of all of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups into
the army’s ranks.100  Some analysts believe that the ANA might offer some lessons
to U.S. forces currently training Iraqi forces.
Operations in Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia might also have
implications for future operations. These three operations, spearheaded by U.S.
Special Operations forces, are low-key — frequently involving a few hundred U.S.
troops — and focus on training and advising indigenous forces in counterterror and
counterinsurgency operations. Some suggest that an indirect benefit is that these
operations involve few, if any, U.S. casualties — an issue which could have
implications for ongoing and future GWOT operations. Another observation is that
these operations, because they are not resource-intensive, can be sustained over a
long period of time which many feel is important when attempting to destroy
established terrorist networks or defeating insurgencies. 
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Congress may wish to examine how the Administration is using lessons learned
from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
in Iraq and also how these operations have influenced the Administration’s overall
Global War on Terror strategy.
NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom
On October 13, 2004, during a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Romania,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly proposed that peacekeeping and
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan should be merged under NATO
command.101  While many NATO ministers were receptive to the proposal, France
and Germany were reportedly adamantly opposed to participating in combat
operations, despite the fact that both countries have troops deployed to Afghanistan
for peacekeeping and reconstruction operations as well as to train the Afghan
National Army.102 While some say that such a merger plan could help to substantially
reduce the numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, others question NATO’s ability
to provide additional troops over and above what they are already providing for ISAF
and PRTs, as well as their political  commitment to a potentially long-term operation
to stabilize Afghanistan.  Others suggest that giving NATO such authority might also
result in not only conflicting views on eliminating the regional al Qaeda and Taliban
threat, but might also impact on the overall U.S. strategy for prosecuting the war on
terror.
It is possible that Congress may explore with the Administration, the benefits
of further pursuit of this proposal, given the reported success of joint
U.S./NATO/Afghan security operations during the Afghan presidential elections and
the generally effective conduct of operations under the current command
relationships.  
Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan
Despite the fact that it appears that the U.S. military is not directly involved in
counternarcotics operations, but instead  providing support to the Afghan military
and police, Congress might act to review the merits of taking a more measured
approach on this issue.  While eventual elimination of Afghanistan’s illegal drug
trade is in the long term interests of Afghanistan and the United States, some have
maintained that these efforts,  which would also destroy much of Afghan regional
commander’s revenues, come at a crucial time when the new Afghan national
government is trying to both “disarm and court” the these figures and their militias.
Many view obtaining the participation of Afghanistan’s regional commanders in the
central government and the disarmament of their militia as a requirement for the
government  to both survive and eventually exert control over the country.  An
aggressive drug eradication effort at this particular time, they believe, might
undermine the greater goal of Afghan security and self-governance.  Others suggest,
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however, that an aggressive program might help to deny Taliban and Al Qaeda
insurgents needed financial resources and perhaps further diminish their ability to
conduct operations against U.S. and coalition forces.      
Southeast Asia and Africa
While the U.S. military’s counterterroism efforts in Afghanistan are fairly well
understood by many, less is known about how the Administration intends to pursue
long-term operations in Southeast Asia and Africa.  Some suggest that the United
States intends to acquire bases in these regions and station forces there on a
permanent basis.  Some have warned that such efforts could result in alienating
countries in this region and driving  insurgent groups, who pose little threat to the
United States, into the camps of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.  Congress may opt
to review the Administration’s military strategy in these regions to insure that it
strikes the right balance between capturing or destroying terrorists and their
organizations that do pose a threat to U.S. national security and not antagonizing
those who pose little or no threat.
